Associate Professor Fernando Beltran

1987 B.E. Electrical Engineering. Departamento de Ingeniería Eléctrica, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia. 1994 Ph.D. Applied Mathematics. Department of Applied Mathematics and Statistics, SUNY, Stony Brook, N.Y. USA.


Fernando Beltrán ( is an Associate Professor with the Department of Information Systems and Operations Management of The University of Auckland Business School. He received a B.E. in Electrical Engineering from Universidad de Los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia, and a Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics from State University of New York at Stony Brook, USA.

As an Associate Professor of the Department of Industrial Engineering at Universidad de Los Andes he taught a range of courses in Operations Research (Linear Programming, Integer and Combinatorial Optimization, Probability Models, Queueing Theory, Network Flows and Game Theory). He led the creation of a graduate programme in Industrial Organization and a Masters programme in Public Utility Regulation. He taught Industrial Organization and Pricing Theory in the IO track of the Masters of Industrial Engineering, and Competition in Telecommunications in the Masters of Regulation.

At University of Auckland he teaches Telecommunications Management for the PostGraduate programme in Information Systems and Data Communications and the Internet for the IS undergraduate programme.

His research interests include the economics of service competition in open-access Next-Generation platforms, the digital dividend, and the efficient sharing and allocation of radio spectrum. He has pioneered the application of agent-based computational methods to simulate and analyse new conditions of competition and regulation in Next-Generation networks and the consumer’s fibre uptake problem in the context of national broadband deployments. His current work is devoted to the application on a combined, complementary approach to auction design by which auctions administered in an experimental environment (experimental economics), on the one hand, and an agent-based computational simulation environment, on the other, are used to test auction efficiency and other aspects for improved auction design.

An academic visitor to the US Federal Communications Commission, CITI Columbia University Business School, EECS Department of UC Berkeley, INRIA Rennes, France, and UPC Barcelona, Spain, he has consulted for various government agencies and telecommunications operators in New Zealand, Colombia, Uruguay and the United States.



Research | Current

Spectrum Policy

The radio spectrum is the essential input to the exploitation of mobile communication services, and in particular mobile broadband. The so-called fifth generation (5G) of mobile wireless technologies promises impressive high-speeds and greater access to a much wider variety of services. Mobile operators adopting 5G technologies will continue to demand exclusive allocation of radio spectrum with an expectation to bid successfully in spectrum auctions administered by a spectrum authority.

The ultimate goal is to obtain experimental evidence on the efficiency of auction-based mechanisms for allocation of shared rights for spectrum exploitation by broadband wireless providers. DECIDE, the University of Auckland Business Decision-making Lab will be used for both, performing experiments with participating subjects and performing large scale computational simulations.

This project aims to identify new approaches to spectrum utilization which, based on the concept of spectrum sharing, can be subjected to tests conducted on an experimental environment in order to investigate their strengths in terms of economic efficiency, their weaknesses in terms of the loss of benefit to involved parties, and to provide improvements in policy matters or advise on alternative pathways.

Designing bidding strategies for auction efficiency testing in a simulated Combinatorial Clock Auction

One of the main challenges of modern auction design is the need for auctions to induce bidders to truthfully reveal their preferences; the latter leads to an efficiency outcome as the auctioned items are thought to end up in the hands of those who value them the most. Truthful bidding is a longstanding problem in auction design but in spectrum auction design it has recently occupied a more obvious place as other problems were much more highly regarded. For instance the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending (SMRA) auction, which has dominated the spectrum auction landscape for the last 20 years, was the first auction that allowed bidders to simultaneously bid for objects whose values are related. An allegedly superior design recently used in several countries is known as the Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) design. CCA is a mechanism designed to incentivise truthful bidding in an environment whereby selling different spectrum licenses, while both providing the means for bidders to "discover" the price and allowing package bidding, is needed. This project seeks to design and test bidding strategies fo CCA in an agent-based simulated environment. 

Teaching | Current

Teaching at University of Auckland

2018          Telecommunications Management, Infosys 730

                  LANs, WANs and Wireless Infrastructure, Infosys 339


Postgraduate supervision


Doctoral students

Hossein Chegini. Decentralising Cloud Coputing Monitoring. (started 2017)

Mengxiao Zhang. Incentives Mechanism for Data Privacy Pricing in Data Marketplaces. (started 2017)

Brett Shaw (Co-supervision). On Network Resource Allocation and Game Theory. (started 2013)

Andrea Herrera (Co-supervision). Resilience in Cloud Computing. Dec 2014

Farhaan Mizra. Thesis title “Modeling the battle for the supremacy of 4G”. Dec 2013.

Matthias Roggendorf. Degree awarded in 2009. Thesis “Dynamic pricing of wireless network resources in a competitive provider setting”

Masters students (main supervisor except where indicated)

Sha Li. Currently. Adoption of UFB in SMEs.

Yvonne Hong. 2013. Social networks as a learning tool in tertiary education.

Hshu, Chia-Chin. 2012. Investigating gender differences in social networks.

Zhi Zhong. 2012. A simulated study of All-IP based open access broadband market.

Fan Jiang. 2012. A critical review of discriminatory pricing issue in telecommunication market economic models.

Vara Thuraisingham.  2012. Exploration of body sensor networks and its application in combating alcohol/drug related intimate partner violence (IPV).

Simon Diedrich. 2011. Next generation networks as two-sided markets - the effect of traffic discrimination on network provider behaviour.

Nina Andreas.  2011. The future of smart homes.

Michael Oberle. 2011. (Co-supervisor)

Ester Lopez. M.Sc. student. 2010. Design of an allocation algorithm for spectrum brokerage over cognitive radio networks.

Oliver Chiang. 2008. Agent-based simulation approach to solving market resource allocation problems.

Honours students

Elizabeth Bond 2013. Effects corporate advertisement via social networks on the price of its share.

Fan Jiang 2010. Strategic Analysis of competition in 3G/4G.

Daniela Dunn 2009. Multicast Transmission and Cost Allocation in Conventional and Realistic Network Topologies.

Kevin Park 2006. Critical analysis of broadband and mobile communication pricing models in NZ.

Swati Prakash 2005. Broadband uptake in New Zealand.

William Ariawan 2004. Subscription Problem in Wireless Networks.

Areas of expertise

Telecommunications Competition

Computational models of network competition, access pricing and interconnection agreements, broadband platforms and open access.

Agent-based Computational Mechanism Design

Agent-based software platform and computational tools to determine the efficiency and equilibrium properties of new or modified designs of incentive mechanisms in the context of the optimal allocation of network resources.

Spectrum auctions and Dynamic Spectrum Allocation

Spectrum sharing policy, cognitive radio and secondary spectrum markets, agent-based computational simulation of spectrum auction bidding strategies and the efficiency of spectrum allocation.

Committees/Professional groups/Services

ITFF, Information Technology Faculty Forum. Chair.

Selected publications and creative works (Research Outputs)

  • Beltrán F (2017). Build it and it will disrupt: A national broadband platform to fuel New Zealand's digital economy. 865-876. 10.1007/978-3-662-49275-8_76
  • Beltran, H. F. (2017). Accelerating the introduction of spectrum sharing using market-based mechanisms. IEEE Communications Standards Magazine, 1 (3), 66-72. 10.1109/MCOMSTD.2017.1700012
  • Beltran, F., Ray, S. K., & Gutierrez, J. A. (2016). Understanding the Current Operation and Future Roles of Wireless Networks: Co-Existence, Competition and Co-Operation in the Unlicensed Spectrum Bands. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 34 (11), 2829-2837. 10.1109/JSAC.2016.2614951
  • Beltran, H. F. (2016). A review of the evolution of auctions as a method for radio spectrum assignment. SSRN Related URL.
  • Beltran, H. F., Sowerby, K. W., & Shaw, B. (2016). The Use of Spectrum at mm Wavelengths for Cellular Networks. Paper presented at Pacific Telecommunications Council Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii. 17 January - 20 January 2016.
    Other University of Auckland co-authors: Kevin Sowerby
  • Beltrrn, F. (2016). Accelerating the Introduction of Spectrum Sharing Using Market-Based Mechanisms. SSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.2807677
  • Beltrán HF (2016). Accelerating the introduction of spectrum sharing using market-based mechanisms. Proceedings of the 2016 ITU Kaleidoscope Academic Conference: ICTs for a Sustainable World, ITU WT 2016, 8 (1), 91-96. Bangkok, Thailand: ITU. 10.1109/ITU-WT.2016.7805719
  • Beltran, H. F. (2015). The transition to an all-IP, fiber-based open-access telecommunications infrastructure and the challenges it poses to regulatory reform in New Zealand. Paper presented at Second Latin American Workshop in Law and Economics, ITAM, Mexico City, Mexico. 19 November - 20 November 2015. Related URL.

Contact details

Primary office location

New Zealand

Web links